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How Should Inheritance Law
Remediate Inequality?
FELIX B. CHANG *
This Essay argues that trusts and estates (“T&E”) should
prioritize intergenerational economic mobility—the ability of
children to move beyond the economic station of their parents—
above all other goals. The field’s traditional emphasis on
testamentary freedom fosters the stickiness of inequality. For
wealthy settlors, dynasty trusts sequester assets from the nation’s
system of taxation and stream of commerce. For low-income
decedents, intestacy splinters property rights and inhibits their
transfer, especially to nontraditional heirs.
Holistically, this Essay argues that T&E should promote mean
regression of the wealth distribution curve over time. This can be
accomplished by loosening spending in ultrawealthy households
and spurring savings and investment in low-income households.
T&E scholars are tackling inequality with greater urgency
than ever before; yet basic questions remain. The Essay
contributes to these conversations by articulating a
comprehensive framework for progressive inheritance law that
redresses long-term inequality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every generation gets the trusts and estates (“T&E”)
scholarship it deserves. 1 In our era of rampant inequality, the
traditional conception of T&E—as a field animated by
testamentary freedom—now seems outdated. 2 Today, T&E
scholars are confronting the doctrines and default rules most
responsible for accelerating inequality.3 But fundamental
questions remain. What do scholars mean by “inequality,” and
how can inheritance law advance holistic solutions?
Existing proposals have overlooked how T&E’s components
fit together—as well as how they complement, or work against,
business law and economic cycles. 4 A bimodal distribution has
come to define the instruments of T&E. On one hand, trusts and
nonprobate instruments cater to the privacy desires and dynastic
aspirations of the hyperwealthy. 5 On the other, intestacy and the
probate system serve low-income households terribly, throwing
intrafamilial conflicts into public view. 6 It is a schism that
reinforces the distribution of incomes and family compositions
across society.

See JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, LETTRES ET OPUSCULES INEDITS (1851) (“Every nation
has the government it deserves.”); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
(1964) (“Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true
is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on.”).
2 Testamentary freedom is the freedom of a testator to dispose of their estate as
they please. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1975).
3 See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda
for Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340 (2014); Palma
Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR.
L. REV. 453, 457 (2010); Carla Spivack, Broken Links: A Critque of Formal Equality
in Inheritance Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 191.
4 But see Eric Kades, Of Piketty and Perpetuities: Dynastic Wealth in the TwentyFirst Century (And Beyond), 60 B.C. L. REV. 145, 177–78 (2019); Allison Anna Tait,
The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. L. REV. 981 (2020).
5 See infra Section IV.A.
6 See infra Section IV.B.
1
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This Essay shows how T&E can thwart wealth inequality—
and at macroeconomic scale. Many of its rules are inputs into the
tax system, a comprehensive redress for inequality. For example,
fortifying the Rule against Perpetuities (“RAP”) frees up large
estates for taxation and, more importantly, incentivizes settlors to
divert assets to spending. 7 At the other end of the wealth
spectrum, where most decedents pass without having written
wills, 8 intestacy reform could preserve assets for productive use
by heirs, thereby supplementing government programs, tax
refunds, and intermittent stimuluses. 9
Yet reforming T&E’s rules and doctrines can produce
distortions that complicate any remediation of inequality.
Tightening the tax loopholes around dynasty trusts might prove
counterproductive if, for instance, settlors chose to invest rather
than spend down money that would otherwise fund trusts. 10
When elites seek investment opportunities in a stagnant economy,
like the one we find ourselves in today, their wealth compounds
much more quickly than the incomes of average wage-workers.
Inequality accelerates in the short term.
We must therefore be mindful of how inheritance laws and
the macroeconomy fit together. Where there is incongruence (e.g.,
between reducing inequality and cushioning recessions) or
indeterminacy (e.g., when we trade one type of inequality for
another), this Essay argues that T&E should prioritize the longThe RAP determines when estate taxes accrue to a trust; if a state has
abolished the RAP or set the vesting period at 1,000 years, grantors can settle
trusts under those rules to escape estate taxes altogether. See Jesse Dukeminier
& James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1304
(2003). See also 26 U.S.C. § 2631.
8 See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of
Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877 (2012).
9 On the tortuous path of debates over pandemic stimulus in the last month
alone, see Luke Broadwater and Jim Tankersley, Biden’s Economic Plan Is Set to
Clear a Senate Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2021; Luke Broadwater & Jim
Tankersley, Republicans Pitch Biden on Smaller Aid Plan as Democrats Prepare to
Act Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2021.
10 See infra Section IV.A.
7

4/2/2021 11:03 AM

DRAFT

2021]

INHERITANCE AND INEQUALITY

3

term goal of fostering intergenerational economic mobility
(“IEM”)—the ability of children to move beyond the economic
station of their parents. 11
By reorienting inheritance law around IEM, this Essay
provides a theoretical framework for addressing inequality. Its
singular contribution is to unify the disparate calls for reform
within T&E. Concerned about runaway inequality, scholars are
prescribing a variety of changes to T&E’s rules and standards,
riddling its defaults with exceptions. 12 Left unabated, this trend
will leave the regime “more holes than cheese.” An overhaul of
T&E is therefore needed—and it should start with the field’s first
principles.
The attention to IEM allows this Essay to take a
macroeconomic perspective that brings T&E into sharper relief,
highlighting the field’s capacity to accomplish two goals—
loosening spending in ultrawealthy households and spurring
savings and investment in low-income households. More broadly,
estate planning is both an input and an output of the
macroeconomy. Demarcations are blurry among tax law (which
effectuates redistribution), business law (which governs the
generation of wealth), and T&E (which governs the
intergenerational transmission of wealth). Yet inheritance law is a
critical interface where the ill-gotten gains incentivized by lax
business laws can be clawed back and redirected into the tax
system in a progressive manner, targeting large estates for
taxation while leaving small estates intact. Assembling these

In economics, IEM can be defined and measured in different ways. On option
is to gauge the elasticity of incomes between fathers and sons, so as to avoid
the variability of women’s income in the labor force due to the gendered wage
gap. See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and
Intergenerational Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2013).
12 See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, What Happened to Grandma’s House: The Real
Property Implications of Dying Intestate, 53 DAVIS L. REV. 2603 (2020) (tax sales
and foreclosures of decedent property); Heather K. Way, Informal
Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113
(2009) (providing clear title to properties inherited by low-income households).
11
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threads into a comprehensive framework, this Essay provides a
blueprint for what progressive inheritance law might look like.
Secondarily, this Essay enriches the law and macroeconomics
literature by illustrating how T&E can check inequality. “Law and
macro” is quickly emerging as an alternative to the efficiencyobsessed, microeconomics-focused bent of law and economics. 13
Yet inequality presents unique challenges. The compounding of
wealth inequality does not swing like, or follow the pace of,
economic cycles—it is a slower burn, though intensifying in recent
years. Since 1986, when updates to the Generation Skipping
Transfer tax spurred the creation of dynasty trusts, the U.S. has
undergone at least four cycles of recession and recovery,
including the financial crisis. During this time, inequality has not
wavered. Some of the antidotes to inequality emanating from T&E
will take generations to bear fruit. And as a stimulus measure,
constraining dynasty trusts might, perversely, incentivize settlors
invest, which further concentrates corporate wealth. 14 We must
therefore be mindful of how laws governing the transmission of
wealth (i.e., T&E) and the economy fit together.
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows: Section II
makes the case for IEM as T&E’s animating principle, abandoning
the misplaced deference to testamentary freedom. Section III
argues that a focus on IEM can reduce long-term inequality,
arresting its velocity of inequality by forcing the tail ends of the
wealth distribution spectrum—ultrawealthy and low-income
households—to regress toward the mean. With these guideposts,
Section IV outlines what a progressive brand of T&E might look
like, assessing reforms to dynasty trusts and intestacy. Section V
concludes.
13 See Yair

Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions,
34 YALE J. ON REG. 791 (2017); Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?,
83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 141 (2020). Professor Listokin now organizes an
annual Law and Macro conference. For the latest program, see Program, THE
3RD
CONFERENCE
ON
LAW
AND
MACROECONOMICS
(2020),
https://lawandmacro.org/#program.
14 See infra Section II.
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II. REORIENTING THE GOALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES
T&E was long thought to be the province of testamentary
freedom, or the notion that a testator can dispose of their assets
however they please. 15 Until recently, neither inequality nor
redistribution played any role in the field. This is understandable.
After all, T&E governs discrete relationships among heirs and
between principals and agents, replete with legal rules balancing
the interests among tightly drawn circles of constituents. 16 Even
the handful of T&E scholars embracing economic analysis have
avoided the subject of redistribution. 17
This Section makes the case for reorienting T&E’s organizing
principle from testamentary freedom to intergenerational
economic mobility. It begins by tracing the field’s evolution from
testamentary freedom to inequality. Then it examines the
macroeconomic markers of IEM.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (freedom of testation the “organizing principle
of the American law of succession”).
16 E.g., intestacy, rules of construction, execution formalities, and curative
doctrines (apportioning estates among heirs) and fiduciary duties
(apportioning the balance of power between beneficiaries and fiduciaries such
as executors and trustees). For a full taxonomy, see Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries
in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2018).
17 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–8 (1992); Daniel B. Kelly, Trust Term Extension: An
Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 85, 87–88 (2015); Lee-Ford Tritt, The
Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2579, 2589 (2011). But see Chang, supra note 16. Law and economics scholars in
particular downplay the redistributive potential of rules. See Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822–23 (2000).
15
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A. From Freedom to Equality
Every generation gets the T&E scholarship it deserves. In
1975, John Langbein wrote that “virtually the entire law of wills
derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of
his property as he pleases in death as in life.” 18 Professor Langbein
made this sweeping declaration to marshal outrage against the
rigid formalism of wills execution, which require wills to be
written and signed by testators and attested by witnesses. 19 As he
and others saw it, these formalities emanated from the arcane
Wills Act of 1677, which could be unresponsive to testamentary
desires. 20 These reformers therefore pushed for probate courts to
suspend execution requirements if doing so would honor
testamentary intent.
At the time, the estate tax exemption was $60,000, and the top
estate tax rate was 77% (applying to a top bracket of $10 million
and beyond). 21 Advocates of estate tax repeal (hereafter, the
“Repealers”) were mostly an unsympathetic band of superrich
families, who notched the occasional rate reduction or legislative
preference. 22 Although Professor Langbein had invoked
testamentary freedom in his fight to add the dispensing power
into the Uniform Probate Code, he would become indelibly
associated with the contractarian turn in T&E’s fiduciary
standards, which loosened the duties binding trustees and
investment advisors. 23 This turn reflected the ethos of the time—
Langbein, supra note 2. Langbein did note estate taxes as an exception, and
he was writing in the broader context of execution formalities.
19 Langbein, supra note 2, at 490.
20 See id.; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1994).
21 Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting,
22 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 18 (2005) (Gallo wine family in
California successfully lobbying Senators Cranston and Dole in 1978 to get 10
years to pay off estate taxes).
23 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625 (1995).
18
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the libertarian creep of law and economics into antitrust,
contracts, corporate law, torts, and eventually T&E. The enduring
legacy of Professor Langbein’s body of work, then, is the
sentiment that testators should be able to dispose of their assets as
they please.
A generation later in 1990, when the estate tax exemption had
grown over 10-fold to $675,000 and the top estate tax rate had
dwindled to 55% (applying to a top bracket of $3 million), 24 Mark
Ascher argued that a decedent’s property should escheat entirely
to the state upon their death. 25 His thesis was driven by the norm
of fairness: excessively liberal inheritance laws permit a testator’s
cold “dead hand” to steer their assets and dictate the trajectory of
their descendants long after the testator had died. 26 For
extraordinarily wealthy families, this meant that a child’s station
in life would be determined far more by the luck of the family they
were born into than their own diligence, which seemed to vitiate
the ideal of equality. 27 Dead hand control also limits the
productive use of property by the living if, for instance, a trust
only gave life estate holders income streams but forbade assets

See Jacobson et al., supra note 21.
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 73 (1990).
26 Id. at 150 (“By tolerating almost unrestricted dead hand control over
property, this nation has always allowed the children of the wealthy all the
financial advantages inheritance has had to offer.”).
27 See id. at 1169 (“Failing to tax transfers of wealth at death . . . promotes and
nurtures an aristocratic class—individuals with enormous amounts of wealth
and power achieved not because of their talents or effort but solely because of
the luck of their birth”) (quoting RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW:
THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010)). This argument has not been
restricted to law or a specific time period. The writer Zadie Smith, for instance,
has said that “[there is the] gift of being born in a certain condition—with a
certain amount of money, in a certain state, with a certain skin color and a
certain gender. And what rights accrue to you because of that? And what duties
accrue to you because of that?” Zadie Smith, Novelist Zadie Smith on Historical
Nostalgia and The Nature of Talent, FRESH AIR, Nov. 21, 2016 (transcript available
at
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/21/502857118/novelist-zadie-smith-onhistorical-nostalgia-and-the-nature-of-talent).
24
25
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from being sold or pledged. 28 Finally, at a time when the U.S. was
fixated on the federal deficit, 29 it was unconscionable to let
gargantuan estates bypass a tax that could bring government
coffers some relief. 30
Shortly after Professor Ascher’s seminal article, the Repealers
gained momentum. Republicans took the House in 1994 after
decades out of power; led by Newt Gingrich, the insurgent wave
was different than the previous breed of lawmakers, who had
sought compromise over trench warfare. 31 These “Young Turks”
allied themselves with the die-hard Repealer Grover Norquist
and then enlisted family farms and small businesses to lay siege
to the estate tax. This coalition achieved its first legislative victory
in the Qualified Family Owned Business Interests provisions of
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. 32 Because this law proved had
been watered down by legislative bargaining, it hardened the
Repealers’ resolve for outright elimination of the estate tax. 33
In the academy, T&E scholars were using empirical
methodologies to show that testamentary freedom was not only
elusive but also deleterious. Melanie Leslie surveyed hundreds of
probate cases to reveal that judges enforce and disregard
formalities freely to arrive at the most “natural” dispositions,
typically favoring close family members. 34 Robert Sitkoff and Max
Schanzenbach combed through trust holdings reports filed with
financial regulators, estimating that roughly $100 billion in assets

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS,
(2009).
29 See, Ascher, supra note 25, at 1171. This conversation now seems quaint. See
Deficit Tracker, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, Jan. 12, 2021, at
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker/.
30 Ascher, supra note 25, at 71–72.
31 GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, supra note 22, at 24–26.
32 Id. at 34–35.
33 Id. at 35–36.
34 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235–
36 (1996).
28
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had migrated virtually tax free into dynasty trusts. 35 Crafty estate
planners were settling these trusts in states that had eviscerated
the rule against perpetuities, so that assets could avoid taxes if
they were sequestered in trusts. 36
The work of Professor Sitkoff and Schanzenbach and others
reified Ascher’s argument, exposing testamentary freedom as the
modus of tax evasion. 37 More fundamentally (and also more
disturbingly), Professor Leslie revealed that testamentary intent
was merely a myth we teach in law school; in practice, courts felt
free to override the decedents’ wishes to favor surviving spouses
and close blood relatives.
By 2005, when Professors Sitkoff and Schanzenbach were
working on the RAP, the estate tax exemption had swollen to $1.5
million, and the top rate had come down to 47% (applying to a
top bracket of $2 million). 38 These drastic changes were the fruit
of decades of organization by the Repealers. Throughout the
1990s, Repealers brought people of color and moderate-income
families into their fold by casting the estate tax as a chokehold on
everyone’s upward mobility—despite the reality that it touched
less than 2 percent of households. 39 When George W. Bush took
the White House in 2001, federal budget surpluses rendered
taxation less urgent, and progressive lawmakers and organizers
could not muster a cogent defense. 40 The Repealers secured the
most sizeable concessions yet for the estate tax; in 2010, concerned
about the mid-term elections President Obama and Democratic
lawmakers even extended and augmented those cuts.
Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359
(2005).
36 Id. at 371–74.
37 See also Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003); Dukeminier &
Krier, supra note 7.
38 Jacobson et al., supra note 21.
39 GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, supra note 22, at 69, 119. Of all the Repealers’
branding, the most effective was to rename the estate tax the “death tax.”
40 Id. at 99–103.
35

4/2/2021 11:03 AM

DRAFT

10

Hence, the diverging paths of T&E scholars and the repeal
movement illuminate the chasm between the academy and public
perceptions of the estate tax. Today, with the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017, the exclusion has metastasized to $11.58 million while
the top tax rate has wilted to 40% (applying to a top bracket of $1
million). 41 Wealth inequality in the U.S. is at levels not seen since
the Gilded Age, when monopolies in railroads and banking
allowed robber barons to pillage their way to fortunes. 42 In the
span of four decades, we have reprised the level of wealth
concentration at which we started out the last century (see Figure
1).
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Figure 1: Estate Tax Exemptions and Top Since 1977
The newest generation of T&E scholarship is obsessed with
inequality. From dynasty trusts to intestacy, scholars are trying to
dismantle the structures most responsible for the velocity of
26 U.S.C. § 2010; 26 C.F.R. § 20.2010-1.
Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, The New Gilded Age: Income Inequality in the
U.S. by State, Metropolitan Area, and County, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE
(2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-new-gilded-age-incomeinequality-in-the-u-s-by-state-metropolitan-area-and-county/.
41
42
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inequality. They have pointed out, for instance, that high-wealth
families can avail themselves of favorable laws and complex to
enjoy a rarified sovereignty.43 This foments systemic risk in the
financial system, shifts tax burdens to lower-income families, and
widens inequality. 44 Other scholars have focused on intestacy,
which is ill-suited to the needs of heirs and survivors in lowincome families. 45 The regime often leads to fractional interests in
housing stock, a “tragedy of the anticommons” that allows
developers to pick up property cheaply, evict residents, and
gentrify a neighborhood. 46
Methodologically, inequality-minded T&E scholars have also
enlisted increasingly sophisticated empirical techniques to gather
information and vet their hypotheses. 47 The burgeoning empirical
literature has covered probate lending, 48 property taxes, 49 the
elective share, 50 and the prevalence of estate planning. 51
This critical T&E literature sidesteps the artifice of
testamentary freedom, as if the imperative to counter inequality
displaces all other goals. Indeed, this mandate has been accepted
by virtually every other field within law. Inequality has taken on
heightened urgency with the string of populist political
movements (both right-wing and left-wing) exploiting economic
grievances, which only widens economic chasms once these
See Tait, supra note 4.
Id.
45 See Mary Louise Fellows & E. Gary Spitko, How Should Non-Probate Transfers
Matter in Intestacy?, 53 DAVIS L. REV. 2207 (2020); Weisbord, supra note 8.
46 See Wright, supra note 12.
47 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Symposium: Empirical Analysis of Wealth Transfer
Law—Introduction, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2083 (2020).
48 David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 YALE L.J.
102 (2016).
49 Wright, supra note 12.
50 Naomi Cahn, What’s Wrong About the Elective Share “Right”?, 53 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 2087 (2020); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Individuated Determination of a Surviving
Spouse’s Elective Share, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2473 (2020).
51 Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Surprised by the Inevitable: A National Survey of Estate
Planning Utilization, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2511 (2020).
43
44
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insurgents assume power. 52 The phenomenon’s “pervasive and
pernicious effects are therefore a feedback loop reinforcing the
concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the
very few at the expense of the great many.” 53 By virtue of its
corrosive power, inequality is one of the greatest threats of our
time.
Combatting inequality can certainly be a goal of T&E.
Clearly, any invocation to history and precedent in defense of
testamentary freedom is misplaced at best and inimical to tax
fairness at worst. We can even stipulate to the pernicious effects
inequality. However, a more basic question remains: What do we
mean by “inequality”? More precisely, what kind of inequality
should T&E address?
B. Defining Inequality
Inequality has different meanings and dimensions. There is
income disparity, which scholars and policymakers often mean by
“inequality,” 54 and then there is wealth disparity, which is harder
to measure. 55 There is inequality within a country, among
countries, and worldwide. 56 Even the proper gauge of inequality

See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016); MARTIN SANDBU,
ECONOMICS OF BELONGING: A RADICAL PLAN TO WIN BACK THE LEFT BEHIND
AND ACHIEVE PROSPERITY FOR ALL (2020).
53 Chang, supra note 16, at 90.
54 See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1553 (2014)
(measuring the increase in child incomes against parental incomes); Ellora
Derenoncourt & Claire Montialoux, Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality, 136
Q. J. ECON. 169 (2020) (gauging wage differentials between Black and White
workers).
55 Sandra E. Black & Paul J. Devereux, Recent Developments in Intergenerational
Mobility, in HANDBOOK IN LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfelter and David
Card eds., 2011); Strand, supra note 3, at 458–60.
56 BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY 7–11 (2005).
52
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is subject to dispute—for instance the Gini coefficient is the
standard measure, 57 but it is prone to criticism. 58
Today, inequality has blurred national boundaries. The
ultrawealthy can travel and move assets effortlessly across
borders. 59 Outsourcing and globalization have hollowed out
manufacturing-dependent middle classes in nearly every Western
industrialized nation. 60 Paradoxically, though, Curiously,
worldwide inequality has diminished in recent years. 61 This is
primarily because a vibrant middle class has emerged in Asia—
more specifically, China—where manufacturing has flourished. 62
Inequality is slippery and persistent. When we counter it in
one area, we may augment it elsewhere. The field of welfare
economics is replete with exercises pondering such scenarios. For
example, hypothetical is a society where the poorest member has
wealth of 9 units, the next 1,000 poorest members have wealth of
10 units, and the remaining 1,000 members have wealth of 100
units. An allocation that absolutely prioritizes redistribution to

See Human Development Reports, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
(2013),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient
[https://perma.cc/9JND-ECCS].
58 See José Gabriel Palma, Homogeneous Middles vs. Heterogeneous Tails, and the
End of the ‘Inverted‐U’: It's All About the Share of the Rich, 42 DEVELOPMENT AND
CHANGE 87 (2011).
59 BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND
THE ONE PERCENT (2016).
60 Branko Milanovic has depicted this graphically in his now-famous “elephant
chart,” which suggests, among other things, that working class incomes in
developed economies have stagnated—a feature some economists have
ascribed to globalization. For a discussion, see Caroline Freund, Deconstructing
Branko Milanovic's “Elephant Chart”: Does It Show What Everyone Thinks?, PIIE
(2016),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issueswatch/deconstructing-branko-milanovics-elephant-chart-does-it-show.
61 See id.
62 This dynamic has reforged the relationships between China on one hand and
the U.S. and Europe on the other. China draws ire for peeling away
manufacturing jobs and pilfering trade secrets, but American and European
sectors from biotech to education are heavily dependent on Chinese funds.
57
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the poorest member may overlook the other members who are not
far off. 63
More practically, some T&E reforms may exacerbate shortterm inequality in their attempts at redressing long-term
inequality. As Section IV discusses, closing off estate tax loopholes
may divert settlors toward inter vivos investments. Given that
investments appreciate in value more quickly than wages rise, 64
the gaps between the investing class and labor will continue to
widen.
Of inequality’s myriad variations, this Essay argues that T&E
must tackle the intergenerational stickiness of wealth disparities.
The field should facilitate IEM by enabling children to eventually
move into a different economic class than their parents. At its core,
T&E governs the transmission of wealth, usually across
generations. 65 It is therefore an apt setting to equalize, as much as
possible, the advantages and headwinds that each new generation
is born into.
The literature on IEM is most fully developed in economics.
From its roots in the intergenerational transmission of earnings, 66
the literature has exploded into a variety of inventive empirical
studies, such as the causal effects of parental education and
earnings on children’s earnings, 67 the correlation between income
inequality and intergenerational earnings elasticity, 68 and the
63 See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 752–55
(2003) (citing THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 125 (1979)). See also MARC
FLEURBAEY & FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, A THEORY OF FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 39–45 (2011).
64 This is Thomas Piketty’s central thesis in Capital in the Twenty-First Century—
that capital grows more quickly than labor. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Goldhammer trans. 2014).
65 Even inter vivos trusts, whose assets a settlor can enjoy during their lifetime,
contemplate a day when the grants become irrevocable after the settlor passes.
66 For a summary, see Gary Solon, Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market,
in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, Vol. III, 1761 (Orley Ashenfelter and
David Card eds., 1999).
67 Black & Devereux, supra note 55.
68 Corak, supra note 11.
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inelasticity of incomes and wealth between forebears and
descendants. 69
IEM is often measured as the stickiness of incomes from one
generation to the next, a phenomenon with both lineal and lateral
dimensions. At the lineal dimension, incomes prove sticky not
only from one generation to the next, but also across multiple
generations. In one novel study, researchers in Italy found that
contemporary families tend to inhabit the same occupations as
their ancestors in medieval Florence, some 600 years earlier! 70 At
the horizontal dimension, the degree of intergenerational
earnings mobility varies geographically. Researchers have found
that moving from a zip code with low socioeconomic indicators
to a zip code with higher ones can have marked effect on a child’s
lifetime earnings. 71
Even though scholars tend to use earnings as a benchmark for
inequality, 72 a focus on intergenerational income differences takes
us slightly off track. This Essay has proposed evaluating
inequality through the intergenerational transmission of wealth, as
well as countering inequality by fostering IEM. However, wealth
is difficult enough to measure even as a snapshot in time, 73 much
less across generations. 74 Two pressing questions follow: what
Guglielmo Barne & Sauro Mocetti, Intergenerational Mobility in the Very Long
Rul: Florence 1427-2011, __ REV. ECON. STUD. __ (forthcoming 2020). As the
authors note, “political, demographic and economic upheavals [that] occurred
in the meanwhile were not enough to untie the Gordian knot of socioeconomic
inheritance.” Id. at __.
70 This study is subject to some criticisms: for example, it cannot really account
for the dynamics of immigration (of newcomers who might succeed or fail) and
emigration (of those who do not succeed).
71 Chetty et al., supra note 54.
72 See, e.g., id.; Derenoncourt & Montialoux, supra note 54.
73 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 2 (2012) (“Income inequality data offer only a
snapshot of an economy at a single moment in time . . . . wealth gives a better
picture of differences in access to resources.”).
74 Black & Devereux, supra note 55. But see Charles Kerwin K. & Erik Hurst
Charles, The Correlation of Wealth across Generations, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1155
(2003).
69
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does IEM-focused T&E look like, and how will we know that it is
working? The remainder of the Essay addresses the first question,
raising the second for future exploration.
III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PROGRESSIVE T&E
T&E stands as the last bastion against wealth disparities,
where the ill-gotten gains of one generation can be clawed back to
start the next generation off on a more equal footing. This Section
outlines the principles of a progressive paradigm of T&E that
prioritizes IEM. Three elements unify such an approach: T&E’s
relationship with business law; our ideals of equality and
opportunity, which inform how much inequality we can tolerate;
and forcing mean regression in the wealth distribution bell curve
over time.
This is a significant undertaking. It requires no less than an
overhaul of how we think about T&E. Relatedly, it also requires
communicating T&E’s equalizing potential to the public, a task
scholars are sometimes loath to take on. Yet more so than in
decades, academic and public attitudes toward inequality are
converging. Politically, Americans of diametric dispositions are
also railing against a rigged economic system. This is an
opportune time for progressive scholars to relay the importance
of T&E, by capitalizing on the indignation of our era.
A. Interface with Business Laws
To galvanize support for IEM, progressive T&E scholars must
portray inheritance as the realm to reset the economic playing
field with each new generation. Due to differences in education
and opportunity, in any given generation, high-income earners
might accumulate far more wealth than everyone else, but that
separation need not carry over to their children—and certainly
not in perpetuity. Inheritance law therefore stands as the
counterpoint to business law: if the latter foments inequality, the
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former shall level the economic scales by progressively reshaping
wealth transfers.
Despite our era of political, social, and racial polarization, this
is a propitious time to reframe the conversation around wealth
transfers. Both conservatives and progressives agree vehemently
on one thing: the economic system is rigged.75 Laws governing
the generation of wealth are not rules of fair play but, instead,
cater to wealthy elites and fuel inequity.
Examples abound. From the 2008 financial crisis to the 2020
pandemic, low-income households have borne the brunt of
recession but were the last to be lifted by the “rising tide” of
recovery. Households of color suffered disproportionately in both
downturns, but working-class Whites were stymied as well.
Indeed, prompted by the embrace of right-wing populism in
working-class ethnic majorities around the world, 76 academics
have been consumed with the travails of the White working class.
This racialized socioeconomic group has been displaced by
globalization, union busting, private equity corporate shuffles,
and other seismic trends; yet they have also consolidated as a

At the conservative end of the political spectrum, the example is the sizeable
crossover of Sanders supporters to Trump voters in 2016. See John Sides, Did
Enough Bernie Sanders Supporters Vote for Trump to Cost Clinton the Election?,
WASH.
POST,
Aug.
24,
2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/08/24/did-enough-bernie-sanders-supporters-vote-fortrump-to-cost-clinton-the-election/ (quoting Brian Schaffner, who pegged this
number at 12%). This connection is far from settled, though. See Brian F.
Schaffner, Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The
Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q. 9 (2018) (attributing Clinton’s
electoral loss to racism and sexism). On the progressive end, the unexpected
success of the Jacobin magazine stands as an example of the resurgence of
socialist economics in our times.
76 A brief list of examples includes the populist right’s rise in Austria, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Germany, the Netherlands, the Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Serbia, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. in the last two decades.
75
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voting block around nativism. 77 Nonetheless, this constituency
shares with the political left the same economic grievances against
ultrawealthy elites.
Uneven business laws have allowed the already-wealthy to
amass fortunes at the expense of almost everyone else.
Shareholder primacy in corporate law elevates equity owners
above all other constituents, including workers (hence, the
dichotomy between capital and labor), 78 creditors (who,
famously, are owned no fiduciary duties), 79 and the public (to
whom costs are externalized). 80 Corporate raiders through the
decades have exploited shareholder primacy to take over ailing
companies, cut costs mercilessly, saddle target entities with debt,
and flip them for profit. 81 In antitrust, lax policies have abetted big
finance, big pharma, big ag, and especially big tech in their
erosion of salaries, privacy, and competition. 82 Sitting on
fortresses of cash reserves, incumbents are able to invest lavishly
See ANDREA L.P. PIRRO, THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE: IDEOLOGY, IMPACT, AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE (2015);
MÜLLER, supra note 52; SANDBU, supra note 52.
78 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 323–24 (1999); PIKETTY, supra note 64. However, Silicon
Valley turns the primacy of capital over labor on its head. There, innovation is
primarily the product of a highly educated and handsomely paid work force,
which is now being criticized for holding venture capital (and its constraints
on erratic founder behavior) on its head. See Charles Duhigg, How Venture
Capitalists are Deforming Capitalism, NEW YORKER, Nov. 30, 2020.
79 See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp.,
No. 121501991 WL 277613, *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). But see Adam S. HofriWinogradow (manuscript on file with author).
80 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733 (2005).
81 Examples abound. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company
Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009 (storied bedding company filing for
bankruptcy protection because its investors incurred greater debts for larger
short-term payouts).
82 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG
AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY (2020); DAVID DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED: LIFE IN THE
AGE OF CORPORATE POWER (2020); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST
IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018).
77
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in tactics that undercut insurgents while conveying minimal
benefits to consumers. 83 What emerges, then, is a two-tiered
business world where monopolies and oligopolies survive—even
thrive—amidst downturns while almost everyone else fails.
Through it all, the largest shareholders of these goliath
firms—most prominently, Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Mark
Zuckerberg, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffet—pocket ill-gotten
gains that are not adequately recaptured by taxes. 84 The tax rates
for capital gains, such as dividends from stockholdings, are
notoriously below those for ordinary income, which is how
wageworkers are paid. 85 Further, the trend today is for enterprises
to move away from classifying their workers as employees, so that
they can forego benefits. 86 Savvy planning can even help the
ultrawealthy avoid taxes altogether, by funneling their assets
through shell companies and jurisdictions that serve as tax
dodges. 87 This has prompted economists to call for taxes on
wealth holdings regardless of their situs, as well as for corporate
taxes based on customers rather than domicile. 88 In reality, taxes
Ufuk Akcigit & William Kerr, Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations, 126
J. POL. ECON. 1374 (2018).
84 On the obscene increases in billionaire wealth during the pandemic, see Net
Worth of U.S. Billionaires Has Soared by $1 Trillion—To Total of $4 Trillion—Since
Pandemic Began, AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS, Dec. 9, 2020,
https://americansfortaxfairness.org/wp-content/uploads/12-9-20-NationalBillionaires-Report-Press-Release-1T-4T-FINAL-1.pdf.
85 See Topic No. 409: Capital Gains and Losses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2021).
86 See Proposition 22: Exempts App-based Transportation and Delivery Companies
from Providing Employee Benefits to Certain Drivers, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF
STATE, https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/22/ (last accessed Feb. 25,
2021).
87 RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAL PLACES,
AND NOMAD MILLIONAIRES (2006); GABRIEL ZUCMAN THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF
NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (TERESA LAVENDER FAGAN TRANS.,
2015); BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE PANAMA PAPERS:
BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH AND POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY
(2017).
88 See PIKETTY, supra note 64.
83
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seem to be paid by those who cannot afford blue chip financial
and legal counsel (i.e., most taxpayers). 89
T&E itself plays a major role in accentuating inequality. A
business owner who engages in a risky enterprise, such as
medicine, 90 real estate, 91 or outright fraud, 92 can set up a trust in a
jurisdiction that does not recognize foreign judgments. 93 This
way, if a tort victim or defrauded contractor sues and prevails, the
settlor would be judgment-proof. Better yet, the trust could
designate the settlor as both the beneficiary and initial trustee, so
that the offender can direct the trust and enjoy its assets during
their lifetime. 94 These asset protection trusts (“APTs”) generate
fees for a coterie of lawyers and financial advisors, so jurisdictions
have raced to validate them.
Liberal inheritance laws premised on testamentary freedom
then allow those gains to be transmitted gratis to future
beneficiaries, forever out of the reach of creditors. In the example
above, dynasty trusts can be settled in states that have abrogated

Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Oct.
27,
2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-thehidden-trillions/ [perma.cc/9APW-M6MB] (“[T]he rich and the powerful
exited long ago from the messy business of paying tax . . . . They don’t pay tax
anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.”) (quoting Luke
Harding, The Guardian; internal quotations omitted).
90 See Asset Protection for Doctors, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNERS (2019),
https://www.assetprotectionplanners.com/strategies/doctors/; How To Set
Up a Cook Islands Trust, THE OFFSHORE CORPORATION (2021),
https://offshorecorporation.com/trust/how-to-cook-islands-trust/.
91 See Michael Kranish, Donald Trump, Facing Financial Ruin, Sought Control of
His Elderly Father’s Estate. The Family Fight was Epic, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2020;
Gabe Alpert, Companies Owned by President Donald Trump, Investopedia (2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/updates/donald-trump-companies/.
92 FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999).
93 See Cook Islands International Trusts Act of 1984 (2004), available at
https://trusts.it/admincp/UploadedPDF/200707241052350.lCookInternation
alTrustsAct1984.pdf (last accessed Feb. 25, 2021). See also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset
Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048–
50 (2000).
94 See Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d at 1243.
89
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the RAP; consequently, the trusts never terminate, and they are
not assessed gift and transfer taxes. In this way, the monopolist’s
children and grandchildren are born into gilded cradles where,
without ever lifting a finger, they can enjoy the fruits of their
benefactors’ aggressive business tactics—a world far from the
descendants of wageworkes.
Yet T&E can also have tremendous redistributive potential.
Certain rules and doctrines act as an input into the tax system
(e.g., the RAP) or bring together rich debtors and poor creditors
(e.g., APTs). 95 These rules are distributively efficient, and they can
be altered to prevent excessive sheltering of assets. Such reforms
might not prevent the uneven generation of wealth (which would
be the province of business laws), but they might slow the
disparate accumulation of wealth over generations.
In the past, law and economics scholars have disparaged legal
rules as a redistributive mechanism because of efficiency,
legitimacy, and administrability concerns. 96 They counter that
taxation is preferable. 97 Today, there is a more nuanced
understanding of the capacity of legal rules to combat
inequality—as well as of the failings of the tax system. 98 In fact,
many governments have written equity considerations into the
way their legal institutions interpret rules around contracts and
torts. 99

See Chang, supra note 16.
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17. This has come to be known as the double
distortion argument.
97 Id.
98 See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126
(2004); Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive
Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1
(2005); Chris Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 1003, 1006–09 (2001).
99 See Kevin Davis & Mariana Pargendler, Contract Law and Inequality, American
Society of Comparative Law Annual Conference, Oct. 15, 2020, video available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1kgoW5cVfg&feature=youtu.be.
95
96
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Inheritance might therefore be positioned as a safety net to
arrest the velocity of inequality as it compounds. In this way, it
serves as a counterpoint t o the loose business laws that allow
enterprises to amass market power, erode privacy, maximize
returns to a narrow class of insiders, and externalize the carnage
to labor, the environment, and public systems. Our society’s
skepticism toward how wealth is generated—under the rules of
fair play in business law—can be harnessed for T&E reform. T&E
can claw back the ill-gotten gains from poorly designed or
enforced business laws before they are locked in for successive
generations.
B. Equality and Opportunity
Classical liberals and Marxists have long tussled over the
inevitability of inequality. While liberals view the market as an
efficient allocator of economic mobility, Marxists believe that the
market simply reproduces class hierarchies. 100 Still, both sides
agree that intergenerational mobility should be high. 101 For the
political right, a child should be able to transcend their parent’s
class through hard work; for the left, structural barriers to class
transcendence should be dismantled. In converging around
intergenerational mobility, both sides would accept some degree
of inequality for the sake of individual advancement and societal
prosperity.
But precisely what type of inequality should we tolerate?
Here T&E can help formulate ground rules for equity and
advancement, by highlighting the distinctions between income
and wealth.

Thomas Piketty, Theories of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility,
in HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, Vol. 1, 430–31 (A.B. Atkinson & F.
Bourguignon eds., 2000).
101 Id. at 431.
100
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Wealth is passed directly from testators and settlors to
beneficiaries. For ultrawealthy households, the assets can be a
pool of financial instruments, 102 real property, 103 or a business; 104
for the poor, there might be no assets—or merely a
fractionated interest in a home. 105 Wealth is easy to devise, hard
to measure, and perhaps a truer measure of inequality than
income.
The intergenerational transmission of income, on the other
hand, is less straightforward. Wealthy household can cultivate
human capital, for instance by investing in education, to maintain
high incomes for the next generation. In this way, incomes become
“sticky” intergenerationally, exhibiting close correlation between
parental earnings and a child’s earnings as an adult. 106 And in
turn, the lack of IEM, as measured by the correlation of incomes
between fathers and sons, becomes a marker of inequality. 107
Normatively, the stickiness of incomes is easier to accept than
the stickiness of wealth. To the extent that education and other
forms of human capital determine lifetime earnings, investments
in these determinants should be encouraged. Moreover, when

See Jacobson et al., supra note 21.
See Kranish, supra note 91. On the distinction between capital and land,
especially as applied to Piketty’s formula, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, New Theoretical
Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals, in
INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: PATTERNS AND POLICY 2–3 (Kaushik Basu & Joseph
E. Stiglitz eds., 2016).
104 See Warren E. Buffett, Letter to Shareholders 11, Feb. 22, 2020, available at
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2019ltr.pdf (“Today, my will
specifically directs its executors – as well as the trustees who will succeed them
in administering my estate after the will is closed – not to sell any Berkshire
shares.”).
105 See Thomas W. Mitchell, Reforming Property Law to Address Devastating Land
Loss, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2014).
106 Corak, supra note 11.
107 A confounding factor, however, is the fact wealthy households often pass
down their family businesses, which then aligns parental and child earnings.
Id.
102
103

DRAFT

4/2/2021 11:03 AM

24

incomes track ability or diligence, a society that values
meritocracy will endure some degree of earnings disparity. 108
Wealth disparity, on the other hand, is not so easily
redeemed. A sizeable bequest by a settlor or testator can set up
beneficiaries for life; it allows them to take risks and start
businesses, 109 give to charities and imprint themselves on the civic
life of a city, 110 or simply live in the lap of luxury.111 By contrast,
being born into the wrong family not only fails to convey that
head-start or leg-up, but it may well hold a child back for life. 112
One way to view wealth disparity, then, is as a constraint on
opportunity. 113 The determinants of income should be, to some
degree, one’s merit; yet this maxim is eviscerated if one’s income
is tied instead to the size of another person’s devise. 114 For our
purposes, as we try to reorient the goals of T&E, we must answer
this question: is the field to curtail the intergenerational stickiness

Piketty, supra note 100.
Kranish, supra note 91.
110 See Melissa Harris and Julie Wernau, The Pritzker Family Tree, Chicago
Tribune, Dec. 18, 2011, https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-xpm2011-12-18-ct-biz-1218-pritzkers-family-graphic-20111218-story.html;
Remembering
Brooke
Astor,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
13,
2007,
https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/brooke-astor-is-dead-at105/?searchResultPosition=5.
111 Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain Their Billionaire Fortune:
Taxes,
BLOOMBERG,
Sept.
12,
2013,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-12/how-wal-mart-swaltons-maintain-their-billionaire-fortune-taxes; Megan Willett-Wei & Mike
Nudelman, Meet the Waltons: A Guide To America's Wealthiest Family, BUSINESS
INSIDER, Oct. 9, 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com/meet-the-waltonswal-mart-family-tree-2013-10?op=1
112 Chetty et al., supra note 54.
113 For a revamp of how we view equality and opportunity, see JOSEPH FISHKIN,
BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014).
114 Of course, even the notion of merit belies the fact that economic success is
mostly dictated by factors wholly outside anyone’s control—including luck
(the accident of the family one is born into) and economic structures (the
winner-take-all free market). See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE TYRANNY OF MERIT:
WHAT’S BECOME OF THE COMMON GOOD? (2020).
108
109
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of wealth or income? On this point, this Essay argues that wealth
should be the focus, rather than income.

C. Mean Regression
To curtail the stickiness of wealth inequality, T&E should
limit the effortless transmission of wealth in hyperrich
households while facilitating it in low-income households.
Visually, this is denoted by the extreme ends of a wealth
distribution bell curve converging toward the middle. The
extremities are where IEM can be most can be fostered most
efficiently. Ultrawealthy households can be deterred from
amassing more wealth, while low-income households can be
propelled forward and upward.
Two macroeconomic perspectives on households are
important: IEM and the splintering of family compositions along
economic lines. Compared to other industrialized countries, the
U.S. exhibits a high degree of inequality and a low degree of IEM,
so that the elasticity between paternal earnings and a son’s adult
earnings is extremely low. 115 While we know that
intergenerational earnings elasticity can be cultivated through
public institutions such as our education system, we are also
aware of the headwinds to class mobility. In recent decades,
public investment in education has dwindled, and households
have responded by augmenting their private investment in
human capital outside schooling, particularly in the elementary
years. 116 Rather than addressing structural inequities, political
leaders are resorting to quick-fixes such as loosening access to
credit. 117
Corak, supra note 11.
Id.
117 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 8–9 (2010).
115
116
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Meanwhile, the past quarter century has witnessed declines
in both marriage rates and divorce rates in the U.S. 118 For higherincome households, these trends correlate with technological
improvements, which have made home care easier, and delayed
childbirth and higher educational attainment among women,
which has begun to close the gendered wage cap (somewhat). 119
Gone are the days of “production complementarities” that Gary
Becker posited of marriage, as a union between husbands and
wives specializing in different market and domestic spheres. 120
Instead, marriage now binds couples who are on similar economic
footing and share similar interests. Among lower-income
households, however, marriage is becoming infrequent, replaced
by cohabitation. 121 This bimodal distribution reveals that
marriage is becoming restricted to couples who are more similar
than different; hence, ensuing marriages are more stable.
Amid the pandemic, this bimodal distribution is becoming
even clearer. While wealthy households work in sectors that can
switch effortlessly to remote, low-income households must
contend with the pandemic face-to-face.
Finally, for ultrarich households comprised of, say, the top
0.01% of earners, curtailing dynasty trusts could prompt wouldbe settlors to invest rather than sequester their assets in trusts. The
lesson from the financial crisis is that when these elites seek
investment opportunities in a stagnant economy, asset and real
estate bubbles are created, and the financial sector conjures ever
more sophisticated products to funnel “rich’s surplus funds” into

118 Betsy Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their
Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2007). See also Shelly Lundberg at al.,
Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing,
30 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2016).
119 Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 118.
120 See GARY BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981).
121 See Naomi Cahn, Dismantling the Trusts and Estates Canon, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 165 (2019; T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL.
L. REV. 55, 91 (2004); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing
Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2000).
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loans for less affluent households. 122 In advocating for restraints
on tax dodges for the ultrawealthy, then, we must bear in mind
whether we are trading in one type of inequality for another.

IV. IMPLEMENTING IEM
T&E scholars have embraced embrace a critical research
agenda that pushes back against inequality. Among other things,
they have proposed that the field’s legal rules be reconceptualized
as redistribution mechanisms, 123 that wealth transfer taxes be
bolstered, 124 that default rules avoid the worst pitfalls of
intestacy, 125 and that dynasty and asset protection trusts be
curtailed. 126 This Section illustrates what prioritizing IEM might
look like in T&E. It begins with the most distributively
consequential reforms: dismantling dynasty trusts, closing estate
tax loopholes, and taxing estates heavily—all tactics targeting
ultrawealthy families. Then this Section briefly discusses
intestacy, which primarily affects lower-income households.
A. Dynasty Trusts
Dynasty trusts owe their existence to perpetuities reform and,
by a twist of tax history, the 1986 amendments to the GST tax,
enacted to close the loophole of estate tax avoidance through
devises to grandchildren (rather than children). 127 The statute
Jon D. Wisman, Wage stagnation, Rising Inequality and the Financial Crisis of
2008, 37 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 921, 925 (2013).
123 See Chang, supra note 16.
124 See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate
Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013).
125 See Weisbord, supra note 8.
126 See Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem
of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523 (2006); Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The
Stripping of the Trust: From Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 529 (2014); Kades, supra note 4.
127 Kades, supra note 4, at 177–78.
122

DRAFT

4/2/2021 11:03 AM

28

allowed trusts to be exempt from the GST taxes but failed to
impose a time limit on the duration of such trusts, leaving their
duration to the vagaries of state RAPs. 128 Over the ensuing
decades, state legislatures eviscerated the RAP by adopting the
wait-and-see approach, 129 lengthening the perpetuities period up
to 1,000 years, 130 and repealing the rule altogether.131
Concomitantly, the exclusion amount for gift, estate, and GST
taxes grew from $1 million in 2000 to $11.58 million in 2019—
amounts that could be augmented roughly six-fold through life
insurance and other estate planning strategies. 132 Today, grantors
with truly dynastic aspirations can settle trusts in any number of
states and forever dodge estate taxes.
Dynasty trusts are especially pernicious in times like ours,
when interest rates hover close to 0%, economic stimulus is
political intractable, and regulators have exhausted traditional
options. The hoarding of assets in trust reinforces a paradox of
thrift within the very circles where spending is viable. 133 Writing
in 2005, Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach reported that states
abolishing the RAP saw their total trust assets increase by $6
billion (up from an average of $19 billion) and average trust size
increase by $200,000 (up from an average of $1 million, right at the

Id. See also 26 U.S.C. § 2631.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (LexisNexis 2016); 20 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (West Supp. 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.27, § 501
(LexisNexis 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3
(AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
130 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §14-2901 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE §§21200 et
seq. (West Supp. 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§15-11-1101 et seq. (West Supp. 2016);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§45a-490-496 (West Supp. 2016). See also Jessie
Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1987); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 157, 157–59 (1988).
131 See, e.g., 37 IDAHO CODE §55-111 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (2017).
132 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 7, at 1318-19.
133 See Kades, supra note 4.
128
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exclusion amount). 134 All in all, approximately $100 billion had
been diverted to perpetual trusts, with virtually no benefit to the
states abolishing or otherwise curtailing the RAP. 135
As the standard bearers of estate planning for the ultrarich,
dynasty trusts have been targeted by tax and T&E scholars and
policymakers for demolition. Some would close the GST loophole
by cutting off the transfer tax exemption at either 90 years after
settlement or at the generation of a settlor’s grandchildren.136
Others have suggested federal legislation either against perpetual
trusts or enabling living beneficiaries to vote for trust
termination.137 Tax is often central to these proposals: perpetual
trusts would look very different if they were taxed mercilessly.138
More directly, as a cudgel against wealth inequality, scholars have
proposed a wealth tax to supplant income, GST, and estate
taxes. 139 Wealth taxes would squarely confront the disparity in
pace of growth between the capital (e.g., real estate or corporate
holdings held by ultrarich households in trusts) and labor (i.e.,
how most households make money), though their
constitutionality is contested. 140
One of the most innovative suggestions has come from Eric
Kades. Professor Kades proposes taxing dynastic trusts to pull the
Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 12.
Id. at 359.
136 Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options To Improve Tax
Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures 392-95 (Comm. Print 2005).
137 Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and State
Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2537 (2006).
138 See id.
139 See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, How Would a Progressive Wealth
Tax Work? Evidence from the Economics Literature (2019), at
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-zucman-wealthtaxobjections.pdf.
Wealth taxes proposed by Saenz and Zucman?, benefits include harder to
dodge (Piketty himself proposes this as a more direct solution to wealth
inequality); constitutionality fiercely deliberated over;
140 See Daniel Hemel and Rebecca Kysar, The Big Problem With Wealth Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
7,
2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-taxconstitution.html?searchResultPosition=1.
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national savings rate up to the “golden rule” rate of 15%, where
consumption is maximized. 141 This rate equals the “sum of the
depreciation rate for capital (roughly, the annual rate at which
capital wears out) and the rate of growth of the population.”142
Additionally, to combat the shorter-term paradox of thrift,
Professor Kades has suggested taxing dynasty trusts as an
“automatic stabilizer” during of economic downturns. 143 These
taxes would counteract excessive savings among wealthy
households, prompting settlors to redirect some of their assets
from trusts toward spending and investment.
Yet perpetuities amendment faces legal and macroeconomic
challenges. Because dynasty trusts are creatures of a race to the
bottom with states competing for trust assets, federal intervention
is required. Thus, the most viable schemes would harness federal
taxation powers or some form of coordinated national
response. 144 Nonetheless, competition for trust assets does not
only occur within the U.S.—it happens internationally as well.
Wealth flows to the jurisdictions that regulate it most lightly, and
grantors have already settled trillions of dollars in asset protection
trusts (“APTs”) offshore, to keep them out of the reach of
creditors.145 Dismantling dynasty trusts here might push settlors
See Kades, supra note 4, at 207–08. See also Edmund Phelps, The Golden Rule
of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 638 (1961).
142 Kades, supra note 4, at 198.
143 Id. at 208–10.
144 See Robert H. Freilich, Eliminating Perpetual Trusts Is a Critical Step Towards
Alleviating America’s Devastating Income Inequality, 88 UMKC L. REV. 65 (2019).
145 An APT is a self-settled (i.e., the settlor is the beneficiary) trust with the
“disabling restraint” of a spendthrift provision that prevents the sale,
assignment, and alienation of the beneficiary’s interest. For examples, see, e.g.,
FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999). See also
Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048–50 (2000); Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden
Trillions,
N.Y.
REVIEW
OF
BOOKS
(Oct.
27,
2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-the-hiddentrillions/ [perma.cc/9APW-M6MB] (“The economic system is, basically, that
the rich and the powerful exited long ago from the messy business of paying
141
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to re-route funds into countries that already operate as situses for
their APTs.
A more worrisome consequence of curbing dynasty trusts,
however, is that it will catalyze certain forms of inter vivos
expenditures over others. Stronger GST taxes on dynasty trusts,
just like robust estate taxes, drives settlors toward lifetime
consumption. 146 Increased spending by settlors and lifetime
beneficiaries certainly bolsters demand for goods and services,
similar to the multiplier effect that Keynesian fiscal policy seeks
to achieve. 147 However, even the most determined beneficiary can
find it difficult to fully spend down exorbitant sums of money.148
If unused funds are directed toward investment, it may hasten
inequality in unexpected ways, particularly during recessions.
Some economists have traced the financial crisis back to
ultrawealthy families and their hunt to invest unconsumed
assets. 149 Prior to the crisis, opportunities were rare because
companies were funneling retained earnings not into investment
or wages but, rather, into dividends (which operated as a
feedback loop for income inequality). As a result, financiers
packaged the wealth of rich households into loans to lowerincome households—loans that were securitized and then sold on
secondary markets. 150 In addition to augmenting the credit
circulating the financial markets, this created housing and stock
tax . . . . They don’t pay tax anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long
time.”) (quoting Luke Harding, The Guardian; internal quotations omitted).
146 Michael J. Boskin, An Economists’ Perspective on Estate Taxation, in Death,
Taxes and Family Property: Essays and American Assembly Report 62
(Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Daniel J. Amato, The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly: The Political Economy and Unintended Consequences of Perpetual Trusts,
Note, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 637 (2013).
147 See Kades, supra note 4, at 195–27. See also N. GREGORY MANKIW,
MACROECONOMICS 305–17 (8th ed. 2013).
148 For actual and fictional examples, see Geraldine Fabrikant, Brooke Astor Has
a Year's Worth of Giving Left, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996; BREWSTER’S MILLIONS
(1985).
149 See, e.g., Wisman, supra note 122.
150 Id. at 924–26.
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bubbles. In boom times, to quote Picketty’s paradigm, the value
of capital pulls away from the value of labor; in downturns,
capital is funneled into devalued assets, sowing the seeds for
inequality. This dynamic mirrors theoretical studies of firm
behavior in low-interest environments, which have found that
incumbents with market power tend to invest while smaller
players do not. 151 Eventually, the smaller exit the market,
enhancing its concentration. All in all, recessions lay the
groundwork for future inequality; prying assets from the coffers
of dynasty trusts for spending may contribute to widening
income and wealth gaps. Put differently, this strategy amount to
trading one type of inequality for another.
How, then, should we assess the different types of inequality?
This Essay argues that T&E reforms should prioritize IEM.
Because the instruments and doctrines of T&E operate at intergenerational interfaces, it they can affect disparities in the
transmission of wealth across generations. For ultrawealthy
households, reductions in assets held by dynasty trusts can
precipitate the downward slide of a future generations of a
settlor’s heirs. Even if inequality is fomented intragenerationally
through heightened investment, it may be necessary in the
advancement toward more parity in intergenerational mobility
between rich and lower-income households.
B. Intestacy
For lower-income households, intestacy stands as the greatest
threat within T&E to the intergenerational transmission of wealth.
Accordingly, scholars have recommended a number of
improvements to intestacy. For example, appending a will as a
testamentary schedule to tax filings would reduce the instances of

151 Ernest Liu et al., Low Interest Rates, Market Power, and Productivity Growth
(2019), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w25505.
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intestacy. 152 Utilizing a decedent’s nonprobate transfers (e.g.,
insurance or retirement plan beneficiary designations) to guide
intestacy distributions would help conform to a decedent’s likely
wishes—especially if it resulted in distributions to non-family
members, who are disfavored under intestacy defaults.153
Similarly, permitting transfer-on-death designations for homes,
often the most valuable asset in most estates, would enable homes
to pass outside the probate system and directly to heirs, reducing
the likelihood of intestate successors receiving fractionated
interests. 154
As with dynasty trusts, taxes are also central to the analysis
of intestacy. Delinquency in paying property taxes, often in
combination with the inability to physically maintain real
property, can result in tax sales and foreclosures when heirs hold
partial interests in a home. Staying tax sales and foreclosures for
a period after a decedent’s death would allow heirs to pay off
those debts and retain the home—or to restore and sell it. 155
These proposals share two themes: honoring, rather than
vitiating, testamentary freedom; and maximizing the assets
passed from decedents to their heirs.156 In some instances,
decedents will not spend their windfall. Inheritance windfalls
may even defy the policy goals of other types of windfalls, such
as when governments give tax breaks or stimulus checks to lowerincome households to lubricate spending. Yet if heirs choose to
hold onto their devises—for example, by living in, rather than
selling, a home—those devises would provide a tailwind for

See Weisbord, supra note 8.
See Fellows & Spitko, supra note 45.
154 See Wright, supra note 12, at 2637–38.
155 Id.
156 They also highlight disparities between the probate system, which touches
succession in most households, and the relative ease of nonprobate transfers
such as trusts. To be sure, probate is intractable for many heirs, but a fuller
exploration of the bimodal distribution between probate and nonprobate is
beyond this paper.
152
153
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economic mobility. And if assets can be transmitted to the next
generation, then intergenerational mobility is all the likelier.

V. Conclusion
This Essay has examined potential reforms to T&E from the
standpoint of reducing inequality. Where results conflict with
short-term economic stimulus, or seem indeterminate in
confronting inequality, this Essay would prioritize the result that
best cultivates intergenerational economic mobility. While this
Essay analyzed dynasty trusts and intestacy as surrogates for
ultrawealthy and lower-income households, wealth distribution
is not entirely bimodal, and many instruments within T&E cater
to the needs of the significant proportion of middle and uppermiddle income households (e.g., inter vivos trusts). Dynasty
trusts and intestacy may be the most distributively consequential
areas of T&E, but the myriad other instruments of T&E merit
research as well on how they affect inequality and
intergenerational mobility. With IEM as the field’s first principle
and mean regression as its economic guidepost, T&E will be better
positioned to counter inequality.

